Introduction
In the past two decades, largely due to disillusionment with the Oslo Peace Process, debates and discussions surrounding a one-state alternative to the impasse in Palestine-Israel have been gaining momentum among Palestinian activists and thinkers, as wells as a growing number of critical Israelis and international observers, including a number of contributors to Antipode (Abunimah, 2006; Bisherat, 2010; Farsakh, 2011; Hilal, 2007; Loewenstein and Moor, 2012; Long, 2006; Mavroudi, 2010; Raz-Krakotzkin, 2011; Said, 2006; Tilley, 2005) . In recent years, these critical Israeli voices have converged with Palestinian calls for decolonisation, and demands for Israel to become 'a state for all its citizens'. More recently these discussions have also been accompanied by a greater emphasis on, and debate over, the possibility of cohabitation in a single and/or bi-national state in Palestine-Israel. This in turn has placed emphasis on solidarity and 'joint-struggle' for decolonisation and democratisation.
However, the growing move towards advocacy of egalitarian cohabitation in a shared geopolitical space is not free of contradictions and tensions. Accepting the label of 'colonisers' has been difficult for critical Israelis. Similarly, accepting the possibility of decolonisation, resulting not only in an end to Jewish privilege in Palestine-Israel, but more so the possibility of impending minoritarian status in a future Arab-Palestinian majority state, in the case of a full or partial return, is similarly experienced as problematic and undesirable. In this sense, support for a one-state solution is not a singular or unified vision. In many respects there are as many visions as visionaries. It is for this reason, for example, that Jeff Halper (2012), ICAHD's founder, argues in favour of a bi-national state as a precondition for cohabitation, while Zochrot's reflections on the Palestinian refugee return envisage a loose federation of autonomous cultural collectivities coexisting in a future decolonised Palestine-Israel (Musih and Bronstein, 2010) . This article's contribution to these ongoing debates is to suggest a rethinking of the relationship between the 'Jewish' and 'Israeli' components of the Jewish-Israeli identity, beginning with an acknowledgement of the role of 'Jewishness' in the Zionist settler-colonial project and its continuing deployment to justify Jewish diasporic settler-colonialism, while denying the rights of return of the Palestinian refugee Diaspora. Thus, a rearticulation of Jewish-Israeliness as a civic, cultural and linguistic community might better serve to break with settler-colonial privilege, while acknowledging and affirming the specificity and history of Hebrew cultural life in Palestine-Israel. In order to articulate some of the ongoing tensions in the above debates on self-determination in a unified Palestine-Israel, and suggest potential avenues for reconciliation in the process of decolonisation, this paper utilises the 'all affected' principle.
The principle, as defined by Fraser (1997) , stipulates that just political action in a transnational world must not rely on the geo-political boundaries of states and their legal jurisdiction, but rather on addressing injustices against those who have been affected by a given institution, whether a state or corporation, irrespective of the official membership or belonging of those affected to the said institution. In the context of cohabitation in PalestineIsrael, this means that Palestinian refugees outside Israel and the Occupied Territories, as well as disenfranchised Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, are considered subjects of justice in relation to the Israeli state and its citizens, in as far as the Israeli state continues to affect their lives and denies the actualisation of their rights to return and to equal citizenship.
In line with further elaboration of the principle by Iris Marion Young (2007) into a commitment to collective responsibility for justice, the 'all-affected' principle should not be seen as only applying to historic and/or ongoing injustice, but rather as a process which needs to be incorporated into thinking about future solutions and visions for cohabitation. This would include addressing the potential, in the case of anti-colonial and/or anti-settlerist struggle, to reinforce dichotomous ethno-nationalist positions and in the process refuse the possibility of the decolonisation of former colonisers (see also Svirsky, 2014b) . As such, the 'all affected' principle takes as its starting position a critique of unequal power relations, while affirming the view that power is not static and does not belong to any given group for posterity.
In light of the above, this paper seeks to address the concerns and rights of the excluded Palestinian diaspora, but also of Jewish Israelis who might wish to remain in a future decolonised Palestine-Israel. However, the principle as thus understood, excludes the nonIsraeli Jewish diaspora as, it is argued, its claim to right in Palestine-Israel can only be accepted if a right to settler-colonialism is affirmed, and this paper rejects such a right as ethically indefensible. Hence, the term 'Palestine-Israel' (or 'Israel-Palestine') underscores the two competing narratives laying claim in/to the land of Historic Palestine (pre-1948) , the state of Israel (post-1948) , and the Occupied Palestinian Territories of the Gaza Strip and West Bank (post-1967) , and alludes to their possible reconciliation as envisaged by contemporary thinkers and critical civil society groups working towards a just peace in Palestine-Israel.
The account that follows is in no way a map, a blueprint, or a prescription for co-existence. The paper's primary concern is rather to examine some of the emerging civil society debates that have arisen primarily in response to the demands of the BDS movement in relation to growing advocacy for a one-state solution as the most appropriate geo-political arrangement for the articulation of justice and equality in Palestine-Israel. This is done with reference to ICAHD's 2012 statement in support of a bi-national state and ensuing critiques by Palestinian supporters of the one-state position. However, it should be stressed that the BDS movement does not currently hold an official position on any state solution, and as such many of these debates are primarily explorative rather than prescriptive in nature. On the whole, these onestate debates start from a rejection of the settler-colonial policies and practices of the contemporary Israeli state, accepting as a given the collective and as yet unactualised Palestinian right to self-determination in Palestine-Israel, and further seek to address the three key demands of the Palestinian civil society's call for freedom, justice and equality in Palestine-Israel.
Decolonising Palestine-Israel
Before proceeding to discuss contemporary civil society attempts to reframe dominant formulations of the conflict and its possible bi-national resolution, a number of terms require clarification. Thus far, Israel and its geo-political policies have been described as 'settlercolonial'. This is a disputed concept for some (see Aharonson, 1996; Mansdorf, 2010);  however, the term is in wide usage by a majority of respected scholars working on the region (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005; Goldstein and Lubin, 2008; Gregory, 2004a; Lloyd, 2012; Pappe, 2008; Piterberg, 2010; Shafir, 2005; Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 1995; Svirsky, 2010 Svirsky, , 2014 Veracini 2007 Veracini , 2010 . In particular, this paper draws on the work of Veracini, who stresses the separate and distinct nature of settler-colonialism in general, and in relation to Israel in particular which, he argues, sets it apart from both colonialism and immigration. In the case of the former, he defines colonisation as a conquered polity dominated by an 'exogenous agency'; whereas migration, while sharing the aspect of displacement with settlement, is different from it in that migrants arrive and are expected to assimilate into a pre-existing and constituted political order. Settlement, on the other hand, is characterised by conquest, 'return', and an ingathering in a place in which the settler collectivity institutes a new sovereign order where they come to be in control of both the usurped/displaced indigenouspopulation, and exogenous others such as enslaved Africans in the United States or contemporary immigrants (Veracini, 2010: 3-12) . and emphasis on settler innocence and suffering -'seeking refuge from persecution' (Piterberg, 1996 (Piterberg, , 2001 (Piterberg, , 2008 (Piterberg, , 2010 .
Disavowal is further coupled with an emphasis on settler struggle, and outstanding contribution to the land, together with an appropriation of authentic indigeneity -'return to the promised land', 'making the desert bloom', and/or 'a land without a people, for a people without a land' (see Piterberg, 2001 Piterberg, , 2008 Piterberg, , 2010 . Indeed, such narrative tropes have played a crucial role in securing Israel's settler-colonial project, from the consolidation of early Jewish settlement in Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel (Pappe, 2006 and , to the present maintenance of the ongoing oppressive tripartite regime in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Azoulay and Ophir, 2012) , as well as the denial of the Nakba i and the Palestinian refugees' right of return (Pappe, 2006; Peled-Elhanan, 2012 Zahra, 2008; Gregory, 2004a; Hanafi, 2009; Weizman, 2007) .
Alongside disavowal and geo-political practices of displacement and resettlement, a further characteristic of settler-colonialism is the elimination and/or physical or narrative replacement of the indigenous population by the settler collectivity (Wolfe, 1999 (Wolfe, , 2006 Veracini, 2007 Veracini, , 2010 . In fact, one distinguishing aspect separating pure colonialism from settler-colonialism is precisely the issue of 'labour versus land'. In pure colonialism, the exogenous rulers rely on and expect servitude by, indigenous labourers, often having colonised precisely for the purpose of extracting resources and labour for the benefit of the Metropole and its representatives. On the other hand, while not always achievable in reality, settler colonies aspire to independence and self-sufficiency, and seek to become the natives of the land.
As Shafir (2005) Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (Veracini, 2007) . Nevertheless, there are also other less bleak examples in which settler decolonisation is an ongoing process rather than a clean and brutal break with the past, such as in post-Apartheid South Africa but also the often neglected case of many South American countries where the European settler-colonial population has by and large assimilated into the indigenous population, further mixing with exogenous others, and creating a majority mestizo (mixed) population. Thus, while settler decolonisation or discontinuity remains a problematic task, it is nevertheless not an impossible one.
Bi-nationalism as a process of Decolonisation
Indeed, the Palestinian call for Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) against Israel is partially modelled on the South African anti-Apartheid struggle which, despite its limitations continues to be one of the most successful decolonisation struggles related to a settlercolonial society. Two hallmark achievements of the BDS movement have been the critical reframing of the impasse in Palestine-Israel as a civil rights struggle for freedom, justice and equality, away from the emphasis on national liberation embodied in the logic of the twostate paradigm; and the rearticulation of Palestinian-Israeli civil society relations away from co-existence forums, which imply parity and symmetry between participants, to one of coresistance against colonisation and dispossession (see Svirsky, 2010 Svirsky, , 2014 .
However, the demands of the BDS call have been criticised by sympathisers and opponents alike, for their lack of clarity with regards to their stated goals, which have the potential to exclude Israeli Jews (Kamel, 2014) , and even for a presumed underhand desire to 'deligitimise' and/or 'destroy' Israel (see Karsh, ed., 2012, Israel Affairs, Special Issue Vol. 18 ). The latter charge in particular relates to a tendency to state Israel's right to self-define as and remain an exclusive 'Jewish' state, with its potential evolution into a multicultural and democratic state for all its citizens being viewed as dangerous and destructive. However, this particular perspective stems from an uncritical assumption that states have rights which for its ever expanding colonial settlements, the Oslo Accords codified further annexation and the physical separation between the West Bank and Gaza, and within the West Bank itself.
In 2014, Israel controls all of Gaza's borders (including indirectly its Rafah border-crossing to Egypt), as well as its territorial waters and airspace, and is in full control of 74% of land in the West Bank, leaving the Palestinian Authority, established by the Oslo Accords, in charge of the Palestinian civilian population in roughly 26% of the West Bank, and in security control of a mere 3% (see also Abu Zahra, 2008; Ghanim, 2008; Gregory, 2004; Hanafi, 2009; Gordon, N, 2008; Weizman, 2007 Weizman, , 2011 . This geo-political reality does not, of course, make the two-state solution impossible, even if for all practical purposes it appears improbable. However, given the current impasse, growing civil society considerations of onestate alternatives are not any more elitist or unrealistic than the improbable proclamations of governmental elites who espouse support for two states while ignoring the fact that at present only one side has the power to make any sort of state possible.
Therefore, a discussion of any state scenario needs to begin with an acknowledgement that the Israeli-Palestinian impasse is a struggle between two deeply unequal sides: one a settler-colonial nation-state with constantly shifting, yet internationally recognised sovereign and respected borders, and the other a colonised and dispossessed population dispersed across the region and elsewhere. This power disparity is perhaps most clearly articulated in the tactics of Israel and the Palestinians. Since 1948, Israel has for the most part, been able to make unilateral decisions to change the geo-political landscape of Palestine-Israel, including but not limited to population transfer, renaming and rezoning of land, military and civilian occupation, and the building and expansion of internationally unrecognised settler colonies in Gaza until 2006, and presently in the West Bank (Abu Zahra, 2008; Eldar and Zertal, 2007; Ghanim, 2008; Gordon, N., 2008; Gregory, 2004a; Hanafi, 2009; Pappe, 2006 Pappe, , 2011 Weizman, 2007 Weizman, , 2011 .
On the other hand, as a stateless people, the Palestinians have largely relied on the mercy of inter-governmental consensus, various nonviolent and violent guerrilla tactics, local, national, and international campaigns, and more recently, the transnational BDS campaign for civil rights in Palestine-Israel (Atran, 2010; Barghouti, 2011; Khalidi, 1997 Khalidi, , 2006 Said 1984 Said , 1988 Said , 2006 Qumsiyeh, 2010) . This is indeed a pertinent task that needs to be undertaken by critical scholars and activists, particularly in light of growing transnational post-nationalist interconnections across the Arab world and beyond since the uprisings of January 2011. Sadly, the remainder of this paper cannot do justice to this rich and complex topic. Rather, the primary concern here is to engage with contemporary re-articulations of Israeli Jewishness or Jewish Israeliness in relation to the process of decolonisation, seeking to raise a number of issues for further discussion and engagement. In this respect, the critical commentary that follows is not intended as a prescription for a future identitarian category, rather it is an attempt to articulate alternative formulations of Jewish Israeli identification and the possibility for its decolonisation.
My suggested reading of Jewish Israeliness draws on a number of existing civil society alternatives to ICAHD's insistence on political Jewish self-determination in Palestine-Israel.
These alternatives have in particular been articulated by activists working with Zochrot and, to a lesser extent, Anarchists Against the Wall. For the latter organisation, decolonisation is a process involving active resistance to, and the dismantling of, the apparatuses of occupation and colonisation, while largely avoiding identitarian debates. However, this has led to accusations that participation by critical Israelis in practical co-resistance activities reinforces a framing of anti-occupation activism as international solidarity activism in what is primarily a Palestinian national liberation struggle. Such reservations are, to a large extent, shortsighted and unwarranted, and both Marcel Svirsky (2010 Svirsky ( , 2014 and Uri address them robustly in their work. Svirsky, in particular, sees co-resistance and the refusal to engage in identitarian politics as an articulative practice which attempts to bring about in the present new modes of cohabitation while working towards ultimate decolonisation.
Zochrot activists similarly see decolonisation as an internal process which has to take place within the Jewish Israeli community, beginning with learning about and acknowledging that Palestinian dispossession is not only Palestinian history but also Jewish Israeli history, and then working towards the implementation of the right of the refugees to return. These attempts to conceptualise the Jewish settler community in Palestine-Israel in terms of an established Hebrew-speaking national community provide a useful alternative conceptualisation of Jewish Israeli self-determination (Musih and Bronstein, 2010) . Their suggested form of self-determination in a shared state is socio-cultural rather than geopolitical in nature, and bears similarities to movements for cultural devolution in Europe, an example of this being Wales in the United Kingdom where Welsh national self-determination is embodied in the revival and practice of the Welsh language and cultural production, rather than a demand for ruling over a distinct ethno-national space. This model stands in contrast to the ethno-nationalist co-governance model represented by Belgium which ICAHD's binational statement draws upon; a model which has been widely criticised for reinforcing the very ethno-national segregation it was meant to combat.
Reframing Belonging
The 'belonging' as defined by embodied spatial and geopolitical configurations (Trudeau, 2006) , and individuals' and groups' location in relation to and in association with others who are similarly located (Carrilo Rowe, 2005) . As Probyn (1996: 19) argues, belonging, as opposed to identity, 'captures more accurately the desire for some sort of attachment, be it to other people, places, or modes of being, and ways in which individuals and groups are caught within wanting to belong, wanting to become, a process that is fuelled by yearning rather than a position of identity as a stable state'. Such a notion highlights the centrality and potential of building on a shared attachment to place, and the identification of the geographical space of Palestine-Israel as 'home' for both the indigenous and settler collectivities.
While the politics of belonging presupposes a notion of belonging as emotional attachment to place, belonging and the politics of belonging are nevertheless two separate but related concepts (Antonsich, 2010) . Drawing on the work of Yuval- Davis (2006 Davis ( , 2011 What these groups highlight is the possibility for critical engagement and convergence between Palestinian and Israeli interests towards peaceful cohabitation, but also the necessity to expand the terrain for contestation and engagement with and within Jewish Israeli society.
As such, critical responses by Palestinian counterparts must address the anxieties expressed and felt by many Israelis in relation to the possibility of decolonisation. The question raised by ICAHD's bi-national statement and Jeff Halper's subsequent response to Palestinian criticisms is primarily a request for reassurance that there will be a place for Jewish Israelis in a decolonised Palestine-Israel. This is perhaps something the BDS movement, particularly its Palestinian leadership, might wish to address. The ANC strategy of reaching out to the Afrikaaner community during the anti-apartheid struggle might be a place to draw inspiration from. Alternatives are also present in similar situations such as Aotearoa New Zealand (see Bell, 2009) . However, at the same time it is important for critical Israelis to remain cognisant of the privileged and relatively powerful position in which their identity has been constructed to date, the necessary deconstruction of which is a precondition for decolonisation.
The above considerations seek to highlight the importance of acknowledging and thinking through questions of identity and belonging as part of the cultural and symbolic process of decolonisation. At the same time, the principle of the 'all affected', which underpins the framework of this paper, foregrounds cohabitation/reconciliation as a relation of justice and a commitment to justice which necessitates a critical reframing and rearticulation of the classed, gendered and racialised structures which maintain settler-colonialism and the injustices it represents. A combination of these critical approaches is necessary, not only in thinking about a just solution to Palestinian and Jewish Israeli cohabitation, but also in thinking beyond the bi-national binary, and moving to address the needs of all citizens irrespective of their ethno-national affiliations. In the words of Harsha Walia (2013: 249) :
'Decolonisation is more than a struggle against power and control; it is also the imagining and generating of alternative institutions and relations... [It] requires a fundamental reorientation of ourselves, our movements, and our communities to think and act with intentionality, creativity, militancy, humility, and above all, a deep sense of responsibility and reciprocity'.
Endnotes
i The Nakba refers to the catastrophic events of 1947-9 during which the majority of the Palestinian population was displaced in the wake of the establishment of the state of Israel.
ii Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates: 'Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive… The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies'. iii This refers to the settler-colonial tendency to eliminate or exterminate the indigenous population in the process of establishing its claim to the land in order to govern unchallenged (Wolf, 2006; Veracini, 2010) . iv This stand-point is greatly indebted to the work of Hannah Arendt (1951 Arendt ( , 1958 Arendt ( , 1970 Arendt ( , 2007 , and David Harvey (2009 ). v See Gordon, N. (2013 for the Israeli High Court Ruling against a petition for Israeli nationality. vi The Law of Return (1950) makes it possible for every person defined as Jewish, anywhere in the world, to make aliyah, literally meaning 'ascent', to Israel and be granted automatic citizenship upon arrival in Israel.
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